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Preference Reversals and Probabilistic Choice 
Any successful descriptive theory of choice and valuation will need to 
allow in some way for the imprecision surrounding people’s decisions. 
David Butler and Graham Loomes (2007), AER 97(1), p.277 
1 The Preference Reversal Phenomenon 
The preference reversal phenomenon was first documented by Sarah 
Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic (1971). It was subsequently replicated in dozens of studies 
(see Seidl (2002) for a recent review). A typical illustration of the preference reversal 
phenomenon involves two risky lotteries of a similar expected value. The first lottery 
offers a relatively large sum of money with a small probability and zero otherwise. This 
lottery is usually called the $-bet. The second lottery yields a modest sum of money 
with a relatively high probability and zero otherwise. This lottery is called the P-bet.  
A standard preference reversal is observed when a decision maker chooses the 
P-bet over the $-bet in a direct binary choice and at the same time he or she states a 
higher certainty equivalent for the $-bet in the valuation task. A nonstandard preference 
reversal occurs when a decision maker chooses the $-bet over the P-bet while stating a 
higher certainty equivalent for the P-bet. The preference reversal phenomenon is an 
observation that standard preference reversals occur more frequently than nonstandard 
preference reversals. In a broader sense, the preference reversal phenomenon occurs 
when a decision maker reveals different preferences (in a predictable manner) in two 
elicitation procedures that are formally equivalent. The phenomenon is often interpreted 
as the failure of procedure invariance (e.g. Tversky et al., 1990).  
The preference reversal phenomenon can also occur when an individual 
chooses the P-bet over the $-bet in a direct binary choice even though the certainty 
equivalent of the $-bet is strictly greater than the highest possible outcome of the P-bet. 
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Such preference reversals are called strong reversals (Fishburn, 1988, p.46). Several 
non-expected utility theories such as regret theory (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1987) can 
explain the preference reversal phenomenon as a consequence of non-transitive 
preferences but they cannot rationalize strong reversals. 
Butler and Loomes (2007) reported a new form of the preference reversal 
phenomenon using probability equivalents instead of certainty equivalents.  In this case, 
a standard preference reversal occurs when a decision maker chooses the P-bet over the 
$-bet while stating a higher probability equivalent for the $-bet. A nonstandard 
preference reversal is observed when the $-bet is chosen over the P-bet but the 
probability equivalent of the P-bet is higher. Butler and Loomes (2007) find that such 
nonstandard preference reversals occur more frequently than standard preference 
reversals when probability equivalents are used in the valuation task. 
The preference reversal phenomenon provides direct evidence that people 
reveal their preferences through their observed decisions with some degree of noise or 
imprecision (e.g. Butler and Loomes, 2007). If the observed decisions were always only 
a result of conscious utility maximization, both standard and nonstandard preference 
reversals would never occur (unless a decision maker is exactly indifferent between the 
$-bet and the P-bet). When decisions reflect deliberate preference maximization with 
some error, or underlying preferences are imprecise, both types of preference reversals 
are possible. This paper shows that a model of probabilistic choice and valuation can 
account for a higher incidence of standard preference reversals with certainty equivalents 
simultaneously with a higher incidence of nonstandard preference reversals with 
probability equivalents. The model can also rationalize the existence of strong reversals.  
To illustrate the main idea of the paper let us consider the following example.  
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Example 1 The P-bet yields $3.75 with a probability 0.8 (nothing otherwise) 
and the $-bet yields $10 with a probability 0.3 ($0 otherwise). Notice that these bets 
have the same expected value ($3). Suppose that an individual chooses with equal 
probabilities between these two bets in a direct binary choice. According to the model 
presented in this paper, the certainty equivalents of the $-bet and the P-bet are random 
variables with the following intuitive properties: 
1) the certainty equivalent of the $-bet is distributed between $0 and $10; 
2) the certainty equivalent of the P-bet is distributed between $0 and $3.75; 
3) a median certainty equivalent of the $-bet is equal to that of the P-bet ($3). 
Note that these properties imply that the distribution of the certainty equivalent 
of the $-bet (the P-bet) is positively (negatively) skewed as it is illustrated on Figure 1. 
If we take two draws from such distributions, we can observe many instances when the 
realized certainty equivalent of the $-bet is greater than the realized certainty equivalent 
of the P-bet and only few instances of the reversed ranking. Thus, an individual ends up 
stating a systematically higher certainty equivalent for the $-bet (“overpricing error”). 
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Figure 1 Probability density function of the certainty equivalent of the $-bet and the P-bet 
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The idea that preference reversals may be driven by random preferences or 
random errors has been around for quite a while. MacCrimmon and Smith (1986) were 
among the first who suggested that imprecise certainty and probability equivalents can 
account for the preference reversal phenomenon. Starting with a general premise “it 
appears that people are unable to determine precise equivalences for lotteries” 
(MacCrimmon and Smith, 1986, p.13) they moved on to demonstrate that “the 
imprecise equivalence theory explains traditional preference reversal … in terms of the 
spread of the certainty equivalence for the $-bet” (MacCrimmon and Smith, 1986, p.15).  
The ideas of MacCrimmon and Smith (1986) were recently reiterated in Butler 
and Loomes (2007). However, neither MacCrimmon and Smith (1986) nor Butler and 
Loomes (2007) developed a tractable mathematical model that formalizes the concept of 
imprecise certainty and probability equivalents. The present paper contributes to this 
literature by providing a formal definition of probabilistic certainty/probability 
equivalents within the framework of a general model of probabilistic choice. 
Looking at the phenomenon from a different perspective, Schmidt and Hey 
(2004) found that preference reversals occur less frequently if people reveal consistent 
ordering of two alternatives in repeated pricing tasks. Hence, Schmidt and Hey (2004) 
suggest that the preference reversal phenomenon can be driven by random errors in the 
elicitation of certainty equivalents. The model presented in this paper is consistent with 
such interpretation (cf. Example 1 above).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple 
model of probabilistic choice and defines a probabilistic certainty/probability equivalent 
of a risky lottery. Section 3 shows that this model can account for classical preference 
reversals (subsection 3.1), strong preference reversals (subsection 3.2) and preference 
reversals with probability equivalents (subsection 3.3). Section 4 concludes. 
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2 A Model of Probabilistic Choice and Valuation 
Experimental studies of repeated decision making under risk demonstrate that 
individual choices are often contradictory. For instance, Hey and Orme (1994) find that 
around 25% of observed choice decisions are reversed when subjects are presented with 
the same decision problem for the second time and they have a possibility to declare 
indifference. Ballinger and Wilcox (1997) report the median switching rate of 20.8%. 
While people generally choose in a probabilistic manner between risky lotteries, they 
seldom violate transparent dominance (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1998; Hey, 2001).  
Hence, we begin by considering models of probabilistic choice that prohibit 
violations of transparent dominance. In particular, we do not consider a strong utility 
model, which includes a Fechner model of random errors (e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994) 
and Luce choice model as special cases, because it allows for violations of dominance. 
There are essentially four models of probabilistic decision making proposed in the 
literature that respect stochastic dominance: 
1) incremental expected utility advantage model (Fishburn, 1978); 
2) random preference model (Loomes and Sugden, 1995); 
3) random expected utility model (e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006); 
4) model of probabilistic choice proposed by Blavatskyy (2008). 
A straightforward application of random preference or random utility model to 
the preference reversal phenomenon is problematic because we need to consider utilities 
of (infinitely) many outcomes when eliciting certainty equivalents of the $-bet and the 
P-bet. We can restrict our attention to a specific parsimonious parametric form of 
random preference/utility model. However, then it is not clear if our drawn conclusions 
generalize to a generic random preference/utility model. Due to these considerations, we 
do not explicitly employ random preference/utility framework in this paper. However, a 
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model of probabilistic choice that we consider below is consistent with the idea that a 
decision maker does not have a unique preference relation and/or the observed decisions 
are described by a random utility model.  
Being left with a choice between Fishburn (1978) and Blavatskyy (2008), it 
appears that the latter model is more descriptively adequate. The model of Fishburn 
(1978) is incompatible with the common ratio effect (Allais, 1953) because it relies on 
the stochastic analogue of the independence axiom. However, the model of Blavatskyy 
(2008) uses a weaker axiom and it can account for the common ratio effect. 
Thus, in this paper we will consider a model of probabilistic choice where an 
individual chooses a lottery A over another lottery B with a probability  
(1) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )BAUBUBAUAU
BAUAUBAP ∧−+∧−
∧−= ϕϕ
ϕ, ,  
where U(.) is the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function, :+→+ is a 
non-decreasing function with (0)=0 and A^B denotes the greatest lower bound on A 
and B in terms of weak stochastic dominance. Blavatskyy (2008) provides an axiomatic 
characterization of the choice rule (1). 
Model (1) has many intuitive properties. An individual always chooses A over 
B if A stochastically dominates B (in this case B = A^B). Similarly, an individual never 
chooses A over B if B stochastically dominates A (in this case A = A^B). An individual 
chooses A over B with a probability greater than or equal to 0.5 if U(A) ≥ U(B).  
Model (1) is consistent with the common ratio effect (Allais, 1953) and the 
violations of the betweenness axiom (e.g. Blavatskyy, 2006) if function (.) is non-
homogeneous. Random expected utility model (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006) is a special 
case of model (1) when lotteries A and B involve no more than three distinct outcomes 
(as in a binary choice between the $-bet and the P-bet) and if function (.) is 
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homogeneous. Finally, model (1) can also have an error interpretation: the observed 
decisions are not always a direct result of deliberate preference maximization but they 
can also reflect random errors or noise (e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994; Blavatskyy, 2007).  
The preference reversal phenomenon involves two decision tasks—a binary 
choice between lotteries and the valuation task (i.e. the elicitation of either certainty or 
probability equivalents). Thus, beside model (1) of binary choice we also need to define 
a certainty/probability equivalent of a risky lottery.   
2.1 Certainty Equivalent of a Lottery 
Lottery valuation/pricing is closely related to a binary choice between a lottery 
and an amount for certain. When people have fuzzy preferences it seems natural to 
assume that the certainty equivalent of a risky lottery is a random variable. Such 
assumption is supported by experimental evidence on repeated pricing. Blavatskyy and 
Köhler (2007) found that only 16.7% of subjects consistently state the same price for 
identical lotteries when the pricing task is repeated for the second time. 
Definition 1 The certainty equivalent of a lottery A is a random variable with 
the cumulative distribution function 
(2) CEA(x) = P(x, A) = 1 – P(A, x). 
According to Definition 1, the probability that the certainty equivalent of a 
risky lottery is less than or equal to an amount x is simply the probability that the 
amount x is chosen over the lottery in a direct binary choice. Thus, the more likely is an 
individual to choose an amount x over the lottery, the more likely it is that the certainty 
equivalent of this lottery is less than x. Note that CEA(x)=0 for any amount x that is less 
than the lowest possible outcome of lottery A. In other words, the certainty equivalent of 
a lottery cannot be less than the lowest possible outcome of a lottery. Similarly, the 
certainty equivalent cannot be greater than the highest possible outcome of the lottery. 
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2.2 Probability Equivalent of a Lottery 
The probability equivalent of a lottery A is elicited by comparing lottery A to a 
benchmark two-outcome lottery Q that yields a lower outcome with a probability 1-q 
and a higher outcome with a probability q. The lower outcome of a benchmark lottery is 
usually the same as the lowest possible outcome of lottery A. The higher outcome of a 
benchmark lottery is usually greater than the highest possible outcome of lottery A. 
When people have deterministic preferences, the probability equivalent of A is 
traditionally defined as a probability q such that an individual finds the benchmark 
lottery Q exactly as good as the lottery A. When people have fuzzy preferences it seems 
natural to assume that the probability equivalent of a lottery is a random variable.  
Definition 2 The probability equivalent of a lottery A is a random variable 
with the cumulative distribution function 
(3) PEA(q) = P(Q, A) = 1 – P(A, Q). 
Similar as for a certainty equivalent, we define the cumulative distribution 
function of a probability equivalent in the following way. The likelihood that the 
probability equivalent of a lottery A is less than or equal to q is simply the probability 
that the benchmark lottery Q is chosen over A in a direct binary choice. Thus, the more 
likely is an individual to choose the benchmark lottery Q over A, the more likely it is 
that the probability equivalent of A is less than q. 
As any probability number, a probability equivalent must be bounded between 
zero and one. If the lower outcome of a benchmark lottery is the same as the lowest 
possible outcome of lottery A, formula (3) implies that PEA(0) = 0. If the higher 
outcome of a benchmark lottery is greater than the highest possible outcome of lottery 
A, formula (3) implies that PEA(1) = 1. Thus, according to Definition 2, a probability 
equivalent always lies between zero and one.  
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3 Preference Reversals Resulting from Probabilistic 
Choice 
3.1 Classical Preference Reversal Phenomenon 
Let lottery A denote the P-bet and lottery B denote the $-bet. In a direct binary 
choice, an individual chooses the $-bet over the P-bet with a probability p1 = P(B, A). 
The same individual states a higher certainty equivalent for the $-bet than for the P-bet 
with a probability 
(4) p2 = ∫ CEA(x) dCEB(x) = ∫ P(x, A) dP(x, B). 
A standard preference reversal is observed with a probability (1 – p1 ) · p2. A 
nonstandard preference reversal is observed with a probability p1 · (1 – p2 ). Therefore, 
standard preference reversals occur more often than nonstandard preference reversals if 
and only if p2 > p1, which is equivalent to 
(5) ∫ P(x, A) dP(x, B) > P(B, A). 
Let us now introduce the following notation. A relatively safe lottery A (the P-
bet) yields an outcome y>0 with a probability s ∈ (0, 1) and zero with a probability 1 – s 
(with s being for “safe”). A relatively risky lottery B (the $-bet) yields an outcome z > y 
with a probability r ∈ (0, s) and zero with a probability 1 – r (with r being for “risky”). 
An individual, who does not violate transparent dominance, never chooses an 
outcome x ≤ 0 over lottery A in a direct binary choice i.e. P(x, A) = 0 for all x ≤ 0. 
Similarly, such an individual always chooses an outcome x ≥ y over lottery A in a direct 
binary choice i.e. P(x, A) = 1 for all x ≥ y. Using these two results it is possible to rewrite 
condition (5) as follows 
(6) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
, d , , ,
y
P x A P x B P B A P B y> −∫ . 
Finally, using formula (1) we can spell out condition (6) into  
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(7) 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
0
1 1
d
1 1 1
1 1
,
1 1 1
y s u x r u x
s u x s u y u x r u x r u x
r u y r u y
r u y s r u y r u y r u y
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
− − >− + − − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦> −− + − − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∫
 
where u(x) denotes a Bernoulli utility function of outcome x, with a normalization 
u(0)=0 and u(z)=1. Condition (7) can be easily satisfied for plausible parameter values 
as it is demonstrated by the following example. 
Example 2 If function (.) is linear and the $-bet and the P-bet yield the same 
expected utility i.e. u(y) = r / s then condition (7) becomes 
(8) 1 2ln 2
1 1
s r s r
s r
+ − −>− − , 
which is satisfied for all r < s.  
There is a simple intuition behind Example 2 (e.g. MacCrimmon and Smith, 
1986; Butler and Loomes, 2007). If the $-bet and the P-bet have the same expected 
utility then an individual chooses any of them with a probability 0.5 in a direct binary 
choice. Moreover, in this case, median certainty equivalents of the $-bet and the P-bet 
are exactly equal (in particular, they are implicitly defined by u(x) = r ).  
However, the distribution of the certainty equivalent of the $-bet is positively 
skewed since its support is [0, z] due to restrictions imposed by transparent dominance. 
At the same time, the distribution of the certainty equivalent of the P-bet is negatively 
skewed because its support is [0, y]. Hence, it is entirely possible that the certainty 
equivalent of the $-bet happens to be greater than the certainty equivalent of the P-bet 
more often than vice versa. In fact, it is even possible to draw a stronger conclusion, as 
we illustrate in the next subsection. 
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3.2 Strong Reversals 
The model of probabilistic choice presented in Section 2 can also rationalize 
the existence of strong preference reversals when an individual chooses the P-bet over 
the $-bet in a direct binary choice even though he or she states the certainty equivalent 
for the $-bet which is greater than the highest possible outcome of the P-bet. The 
highest possible outcome of the P-bet is y. The probability that the certainty equivalent 
of the $-bet is strictly greater than y is 1 – CEB(y) = P(B, y). Therefore, the probability 
of observing a strong reversal is (1 – p1 ) · P(B, y). We already established that the 
probability of observing a nonstandard preference reversal is p1 · (1 – p2 ). Thus, strong 
reversals are more likely to occur than nonstandard preference reversals if (1 – p1 ) · 
P(B, y) > p1 · (1 – p2 ), which is equivalent to 
(9) ∫ P(x, A) dP(x, B) > 1 – P(A, B)·P(B, y)/P(B, A). 
If a binary choice probability function P(.,.) always respects transparent 
dominance i.e. if P(x, A) = 0 for all x ≤ 0 and P(x, A) = 1 for all x ≥ y, then we can 
rewrite condition (9) as follows 
(10) ( ) ( ) ( )( )0
,
, d , 1
,
y P B y
P x A P x B
P B A
> −∫ . 
Finally, given a specific model (1) of probabilistic choice, we can spell out 
condition (10) into  
(11) 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
0
1 1
d
1 1 1
1
.
1 1
y s u x r u x
s u x s u y u x r u x r u x
r u y s r u y
r u y r u y
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
− − >− + − − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
− − −> − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
∫
 
It turns out that condition (11) can be satisfied for typical parameterizations 
that are used in the empirical studies on the preference reversal phenomenon. For 
illustration, let us again consider Example 2. 
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Example 2 (continued) If function (.) is linear and the $-bet and the P-bet 
yield the same expected utility then condition (11) becomes 
(12) 1 2 1 2 3ln 2
1 1 1 2
s r s r s r
s r s r
+ − − + −>− − + − . 
The left hand side of inequality (12) becomes unboundedly large if probability 
s gets close to one. However, the right hand side of inequality (12) cannot be larger than 
three if r < s. Hence, condition (12) is satisfied when probability s is sufficiently close 
to one and probability r is not too large (compared to s).  
The set of all parameters (s, r) that satisfy inequality (12) is shown as a shaded 
area on Figure 2. Figure 2 also plots parameters (s, r) used in the experiment of Tversky 
et al. (1990), which were subsequently reemployed in several other studies (e.g. Cubitt 
et al., 2004; Blavatskyy and Köhler, 2007). These typical parameterizations largely fall 
in the area of admissible parameters, which are consistent with a high incidence of 
strong preference reversals (under extremely simplifying assumptions that function (.) 
is linear and the $-bet and the P-bet yield the same expected utility). Thus, the model of 
probabilistic choice presented in Section 2 can account for strong preference reversals. 
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Figure 2 The set of parameters satisfying condition (12) (shaded area) and 
parameters used in Tversky et al. (1990) study (diamond markers) 
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3.3 Preference Reversals with Probability Equivalents 
The model of probabilistic choice presented in Section 2 can also account for a 
higher incidence of nonstandard preference reversals documented by Butler and Loomes 
(2007), when an individual chooses the $-bet over the P-bet in a direct binary choice but 
at the same time he or she states a higher probability equivalent for the P-bet. In a direct 
binary choice, an individual chooses the $-bet over the P-bet with a probability p1 = 
P(B, A). The likelihood that the probability equivalent of the P-bet is greater than the 
probability equivalent of the $-bet is given by 
(13) p3 = ∫ PEB(q) dPEA(q). 
Hence, nonstandard preference reversals occur with a probability p1 · p3. At the 
same time, standard preference reversals happen with a probability (1 – p1 ) · (1 – p3). 
Nonstandard preference reversals occur more often than the standard ones if and only if 
p3 > 1 – p1, which is equivalent to  
(14)  ∫ PEB(q) dPEA(q) > P(A, B). 
If an individual does not violate transparent dominance, the probability 
equivalent of the $-bet cannot be greater than r i.e. PEB(q) = 1 for all q ≥ r. Using this 
result we can rewrite inequality (14) as follows 
(15) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
d , ,
r
B APE q PE q P A B P A R> −∫ , 
where R denotes a benchmark lottery that yields a higher outcome with a probability r 
(and zero with a probability 1 – r ). Finally, if binary choice probabilities admit 
representation (1), we can spell out condition (15) into 
(16) 
[ ]( )
[ ]( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
0
1
d
1
,
1
r q v u yq v
q v r q q v u y s q u y
s r u y s r u y
s r u y r u y s r u y r v u y
ϕϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
−⎡ ⎤− ⎣ ⎦ >− + − − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
− −> −− + − − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∫
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where v > 1 denotes the utility of a higher outcome in the benchmark lottery that is used 
for eliciting probability equivalents. Condition (16) can hold for plausible parameter 
values. To demonstrate this, let us return to Example 2. 
Example 2 (continued) If function (.) is linear and the $-bet and the P-bet 
yield the same expected utility then condition (16) becomes 
(17) ( )( )
1 2
ln 2
1
s v r s r
s v sv r
+ − −>− − , 
which is satisfied for all r < s and all v > 1. 
There is a simple intuition behind this result. If the expected utilities of the $-
bet and the P-bet are the same, then an individual chooses with probabilities 50%-50% 
between them. Moreover, a median probability equivalent of the $-bet is the same as 
that of the P-bet (in particular, it is equal to r / v ). However, distributions of probability 
equivalents of the $-bet and the P-bet are likely to be skewed in opposite directions. On 
the one hand, the distribution for the $-bet is likely to be negatively skewed because it 
has support on [0, r]. On the other hand, the distribution for the P-bet is positively 
skewed because it has support on [0, s]. Thus, it is possible that an individual states a 
higher probability equivalent for the P-bet more often than he or she does for the $-bet. 
Notice that inequality (16) may hold simultaneously with inequality (7), as it is 
illustrated in Example 2. In other words, the model of probabilistic choice presented in 
Section 2 can account for a higher incidence of standard preference reversals for 
certainty equivalents simultaneously with a higher incidence of non-standard preference 
reversals for probability equivalents. In contrast, Cubitt et al. (2004) demonstrate that 
many of the existing models can account only for one side of the coin: if they can 
explain the classical preference reversal phenomenon then they cannot accommodate 
empirical evidence on preference reversals with probability equivalents.  
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4 Conclusion 
The preference reversal phenomenon is an intriguing empirical regularity that 
continues to attract the attention of experimentalists (e.g. Bateman et al., 2007) and 
theorists alike (e.g. Schmidt et al., 2008). Several authors, most notably MacCrimmon 
and Smith (1986) and Butler and Loomes (2007), argued that preference reversals may 
be a reflection of imprecise certainty/probability equivalents. This paper presents a 
formal model that builds on such ideas. 
As a starting building block, we take a model of probabilistic choice recently 
axiomatized by Blavatskyy (2008). This model has many intuitive features. In particular, 
the model rules out violations of transparent dominance. This model of binary choice is 
augmented by a novel definition of a probabilistic certainty/probability equivalent of a 
lottery. The certainty equivalent of a lottery is defined as a random variable such that 
the probability of the certainty equivalent being less than or equal to x is simply equal to 
the probability that the amount x is chosen over the lottery in a direct binary choice.  
The probability equivalent of a lottery A is defined in a similar way. It is a 
random variable such that the likelihood of the probability equivalent being less than or 
equal to q is equal to the likelihood that a benchmark two-outcome lottery that yield  a 
higher outcome with probability q is chosen over the lottery A in a direct binary choice. 
Note that these proposed definitions do not depend on a specific model of probabilistic 
choice that we used in this paper. They can be also combined with a random utility 
model (e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006), a random preference model (Loomes and 
Sugden, 1995) or an incremental expected utility advantage model (Fishburn, 1978).  
Since an individual does not violate transparent dominance the distribution of 
the certainty equivalent of any lottery is restricted to have its support between the 
lowest and the highest possible outcome of the lottery. Furthermore, if the $-bet and the 
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P-bet yield similar expected utility, median certainty equivalents of the two bets are 
similar as well. All in all, this implies that the certainty equivalent of the $-bet is 
positively skewed but the certainty equivalent of the P-bet is negatively skewed. Hence, 
an individual may value the $-bet over the P-bet more frequently than vice versa.  
In fact, the proposed model can also rationalize strong preference reversals 
when an individual chooses the P-bet over the $-bet in a direct binary choice but values 
the $-bet more than the highest possible outcome of the P-bet. The paper also shows 
that the model can account for a higher incidence of nonstandard preference reversals 
with probability equivalents. These occur when an individual chooses the $-bet over the 
P-bet in a direct binary choice but states a higher probability equivalent for the P-bet. 
Theoretical results of this paper clearly demonstrate that probabilistic choice 
models have a significant potential for explaining behavioral regularities. While the 
preference reversal phenomenon is a puzzling observation in the classical world of 
deterministic preferences, it is not really a phenomenon once we admit the possibility 
that individual preferences are somewhat fuzzy or imprecise. A simple model of fuzzy 
preferences can generate systematic preference reversals in different elicitation methods 
that are formally equivalent under the assumption that an individual has a unique 
preference relation. 
This conclusion contrasts with a more pessimistic conclusion of Cubitt et al. 
(2004) who conjectured that “a stochastic variant of GET [generalized economic theory] 
is not an obviously promising line of attack” for explaining a high incidence of standard 
preference reversals for certainty equivalents simultaneously with a high incidence of 
nonstandard preference reversals for probability equivalents. It appears that Cubitt et al. 
(2004) considered only the possibility of heterogeneous errors across individuals but not 
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across elicitation tasks. In other words, they did not envisage that there may be a model 
of probabilistic choice that generates the distributions of certainty equivalents and 
probability equivalents, which are skewed in the opposite directions. 
The model presented in this paper has exactly this feature. In particular, the 
distribution of the certainty equivalent of the $-bet is positively skewed but the 
distribution of the probability equivalent of the $-bet is likely to be negatively skewed. 
At the same time, the opposite holds for the P-bet. Its distribution of the certainty 
equivalent is negatively skewed but its distribution of the probability equivalent is 
positively skewed. Such skewness in the opposite directions allows our model to 
explain overpricing of the $-bet simultaneously with a high incidence of nonstandard 
preference reversals for probability equivalents. 
For economists working with empirical data on binary choices between risky 
lotteries it long became customary to embed a deterministic decision theory into a 
model of probabilistic choice (e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994). Perhaps, it is now time to 
abandon the idea of people having deterministic certainty/probability equivalents for 
risky gambles. The theoretical model presented in this paper offers a unified approach 
for describing the decisions of an individual whose binary choices and stated valuations 
are both done in a probabilistic manner.  
The presented model can be easily applied in empirical work where a data set 
contains both revealed binary choices and stated valuations (in the form of certainty or 
probability equivalents). Using a one-parameter functional form for function (.) such 
as (x) = xa or (x) = exp(a·x) – 1, a = const, a researcher obtains a parsimonious model 
with only one extra parameter compared to neoclassical expected utility theory. Such 
model may have considerable descriptive merit since it can account for the common 
ration effect, violations of the betweenness and the preference reversal phenomenon. 
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